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3 Law, Culture, and Conflict
Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan
eric a.  feldman
50
I .  INTRODUCTION
The 1963 publication of Takeyoshi Kawashima’s “Dispute Resolutionin Contemporary Japan” has indelibly influenced the  study of lawand conflict in postwar Japan. A mere nineteen text pages of Arthur
Taylor von Mehren’s seven hundred–page volume, Law in Japan: The Legal
Order in a Changing Society,1 Kawashima’s observations about the infrequency
of litigation in Japan, and his emphasis on the sociocultural context of
conflict, continue to resonate. As a noted scholar of Japanese law has suc-
cinctly written, “Virtually every scholarly work [about Japanese law] in the
last thirty-five years has been framed in some way or another by the conceptual
construct Professor Kawashima offered.”2
Kawashima was appointed as a professor of civil law at Japan’s preemi-
nent legal academy, the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo, before
the outbreak of World War II. He held that institution’s first chair of legal
sociology, and during his career he published scores of books and articles.
But “Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan” was Kawashima’s first
article to be translated into English, and it remains the most complete access
to his work for English-language readers unable to tackle the vernacular Japa-
nese text.3
It is a matter of speculation as to why “Dispute Resolution in Contem-
porary Japan” fell on such receptive ears. Perhaps it spoke to concerns about
American litigiousness that were on the minds of legal academics and pol-
icy makers, who were looking for ways to rein in the use of the courts in the
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United States. Maybe it fit well with the stereotypes of Japan developed in
the preceding years by English speakers, many of who had been schooled on
the work of Ruth Benedict and others who emphasized the uniqueness of Japa-
nese culture.4 Possibly it filled a void—there was very little work on Japanese
law available in English in 1963, and even less that was well written, interest-
ing, and relatively free of jargon. Surely Kawashima’s article and much of his
other work articulated a point of view that resonated with Japanese scholars
and students, who continue to read and emulate his work. At least in part, Kawa-
shima’s appeal to both foreign and Japanese readers was that his article was
rich with insight and had identified a challenging puzzle—why was litiga-
tion uncommon in Japan?—whatever one may think of the solution he offers.5
“Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan” has served as a Rorschach
test for succeeding generations of Japanese and American legal scholars.6 For
those seeking a normative statement about the role of law in Japanese soci-
ety, Kawashima’s article appears to supply an answer. His portrayal of the
importance of informal mechanisms of dispute resolution, and the sidelin-
ing of litigation as a last resort in intractable conflicts involving “pugnacious,
litigious fellows,” has been read to imply the desirability, indeed superiority,
of solving conflict without resort to the formal mechanisms of law. In con-
trast to a society in which lawyers and courts depersonalize disputes and
destroy the social fabric, Japan is described as a place where a powerful social
glue can be stretched, but not snapped, by conflict. 
As a theoretical exercise, Kawashima also stimulated debate. Legal theo-
rists interested in the relationship between law and society found food for
thought in Kawashima’s account of Japan, which seems to present an ideal
case for tracing the allegedly powerful links between industrialization, urban-
ization, and a modern legal system.7 Like his contemporary, political theo-
rist Masao Maruyama, Kawashima was deeply interested in the mechanisms
through which Japan would modernize, and he was particularly concerned
with how new, democratic institutions would arise and develop.8 Surely Kawa-
shima’s prediction that law and litigation would come to occupy an increas-
ingly important role in Japan had to be correct; the very best theories of his
day emphasized the increasing similarity between Japan and other econom-
ically developed nations, and many were convinced that their “convergence”
was inevitable.9
Descriptively, “Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan” struck a res-
onant chord. For Japanese readers, Kawashima seemed to have uncovered a
deep and compelling truth. Scholars and laypeople alike knew that the Japa-
nese sought ways to manage conflict that kept disputes informal. Kawashima
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claimed to have identified the underlying explanation for this behavior: a set
of values deeply embedded in Japanese culture that shaped the way individ-
uals handled conflict. Western readers were similarly impressed. They saw in
Kawashima an elegant confirmation of exactly what they had always suspected.
The Japanese were close-knit, inward looking, inscrutable; they were part of
a culture that honored a set of values anathema to Western rationalism.10
It is tempting to write off Kawashima as being whatever one wants him
to be, and no more. But his esteemed position in the pantheon of Japanese
legal scholars counsels against a facile dismissal. His writings are still read by
many law students in Japan; scholars in and out of Japan continue to cite him,
challenge him, reify him, and feel irritated by him; in American classes about
Japanese law his writings are generally on the syllabus, and many students
find them compelling.
This chapter first identifies the central claims of Kawashima’s article and
evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. Next, it examines four types of schol-
arship on Japanese law that owe a significant debt to Kawashima: culturalist
views of Japanese law, institutional analyses of the Japanese legal system, law
and economics approaches to legal behavior in Japan, and case studies of Japa-
nese law and society. In doing so, it further explores Kawashima’s most sig-
nificant contributions as well as his oversights. The article concludes with a
brief discussion of the recent movement to reform the legal system, which
seems likely to bring about at least some of the changes to dispute resolution
that Kawashima predicted. Both too much and too little have been read into
Kawashima’s work. Its elegant simplicity hides a complex set of observations.
At the same time, those observations can be clearly stated and evaluated.
I I .  KAWASHIMA’S THEORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Aside from a requisite citation to Arthur Taylor von Mehren, a distinguished
Harvard Law School professor and the editor of Law in Japan: The Legal Order
in a Changing Society, Kawashima’s essay referenced only one non-Japanese
scholar’s work on Japanese law. That distinction belongs to Dan Fenno Hen-
derson, whose magisterial work on conciliation in the Tokugawa era is one
of the most intellectually rich studies of the Japanese legal system in any lan-
guage.11 Henderson’s work detailed the process of extrajudicial dispute res-
olution in premodern and modern Japan, and in so doing revealed the state’s
direct involvement in Japanese conflict management. Disputants were often
required by government decree to submit to conciliation before bringing their
claims to court and found themselves obligated to follow a set of procedures
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that made it difficult, often impossible, to file a lawsuit. The power of
Henderson’s work came from its careful analysis of the mechanism of con-
ciliation, with its attention to the interplay between institutional design and
social practice. 
Kawashima was familiar with at least some of Henderson’s writings; he
cites a 1952 article, “Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law,” in his discussion of
conciliation after the Meiji Restoration.12 Moreover, nothing in Kawashima’s
article suggests that he rejects Henderson’s emphasis on the involvement of
the state in promoting the extrajudicial dispute resolution process. To the con-
trary, he appears to fully embrace Henderson’s perspective. In his discussion
of Japanese industrialization and urbanization during World War I, for exam-
ple, Kawashima notes that the traditional social structure was becoming
unhinged. Litigation increased, and “those who had been in an inferior posi-
tion began to assert their legal rights.”13 By requiring conciliation, the gov-
ernment was able to “wash away” (mizu ni nagasu) disputes. “[T]he emerging
individualistic interests of lessees, tenants, and employees,” Kawashima
writes, “were to be kept from being converted into firmly established vested
interests independent of the will of their superiors.”14
Kawashima’s embrace of Henderson’s perspective would not be particu-
larly notable if it simply reflected the seriousness with which one prominent
academic took the work of a peer. What makes it surprising is that Hender-
son’s emphasis on the coercive nature of conciliation flatly contradicts the
standard interpretation of Kawashima. According to that interpretation,
Kawashima is devoted to monolithic cultural explanations of Japanese legal
behavior. In fact, that view finds some support in “Dispute Resolution in Con-
temporary Japan.” Kawashima claims, for example, that of the “several pos-
sible explanations for [the] relative lack of litigation [in Japan],” the most
important can be “found in the socio-cultural background of the problem,”
particularly in “the nature of the traditional social groups in Japan.”15 Those
groups, he says, “may be epitomized by two characteristics. First, they are
hierarchical in the sense that social status is differentiated in terms of defer-
ence and authority . . . Second . . . social roles are defined in general and very
flexible terms . . . [T]his definition of social roles can be, and commonly is,
characterized by the term ‘harmony.’ ”16 
To be sure, these claims are overgeneralized, which makes Kawashima par-
ticularly vulnerable to the charge of being too enamored by the influence of
culture while neglecting to say what culture means. One need only go back
to the beginning of his essay, however, to contextualize his claims about law,
culture, and dispute resolution. In the very first paragraph, he states: 
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There is probably no society in which litigation is the normal means of resolv-
ing disputes. Rarely will both parties press their claims so far as to require resort
to a court; instead, one of the disputants will probably offer a satisfactory set-
tlement or propose the use of some extrajudicial, informal procedure.
Although direct evidence of this tendency is difficult to obtain, the phenom-
ena described below offer indirect support for the existence of these attitudes
among the Japanese people.17
In other words, Kawashima’s argument is that the vast majority of Japa-
nese legal attitudes and practices are fundamentally similar to those in other
nations. His essay is not explicitly rooted in a view of Japanese uniqueness;
to the contrary, Kawashima is pressing for an understanding of dispute res-
olution in Japan that strongly resembles dispute resolution in every other soci-
ety. And while he does not overly emphasize the role of the state in forging
and framing approaches to dispute resolution, Kawashima’s invocation of
Henderson makes clear that his devotion to cultural explanations is bounded.
Nonetheless, he does see a crucial role for culture: to the extent that nations
develop generalizable cultural practices and values, Kawashima suggests that
those practices and values can help us to understand how people resolve their
disputes.
Kawashima’s claim that Japanese disputants generally resolve their conflicts
without going to court is not merely a theoretical formulation. Much of the
power of Kawashima’s analysis comes from his use of data. The text of
Kawashima’s article is followed by fourteen tables, documenting the num-
ber of civil cases filed from 1925 and 1934, litigation over traffic accidents from
1953 to 1960, the percentage of administrative cases appealed to high courts,
the amount of time it took for district courts to resolve cases from 1916 to
1959, and many other issues. Based on these data, he argues that mediation
prevailed even when one might predict that the dams would break and the
courts would be flooded with claims. An acute housing shortage following
World War II, for example, led to conflict over housing, but not much litiga-
tion. The economic depression after 1927 caused a large number of bank-
ruptcies, but no surge of lawsuits. In the quotidian world of common public
transportation, few cases were brought involving taxi or train accidents. In
short, Kawashima argues that despite certain social changes, litigation rates
in Japan did not increase.
Culture is neither the first nor the only explanation Kawashima provides
to explain the data. First, he notes that litigation takes time and costs money,
so many are dissuaded. Second, he observes that those who are willing to
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expend time and money are poorly rewarded because litigation results in min-
imal compensation. Together, these explanations at least to some extent antic-
ipate a rational actor perspective on litigation, as will be discussed below. Third,
Kawashima asserts that there is an underlying incompatibility between the
universalistic standards of litigation (by which he seems to mean black-let-
ter legal rules applied by an objective judge without regard to the status or
characteristics of the parties) and certain sociocultural currents in Japan, such
as a tradition of deferring to authority and the contingency of social roles.
It is crucial to remember that all three of these responses remain tightly con-
tained. They do not assert that the reluctance to litigate is a particularly Japa-
nese characteristic. Instead, they take as a given that litigation is uncommon
everywhere and provide an explanation for the Japanese experience: distinc-
tive perhaps, but not unique.18
Nonetheless, Kawashima complicates (and ultimately weakens) his argu-
ment by focusing on what he considers Japan’s most distinctive element of
dispute resolution, its low litigation rate, which he thinks is the consequence
of a limited number of lawyers and a lack of industrialization. The result, in
his view, is that in comparison to the West “demand for lawyers’ services is
not great” in Japan. Had he remembered Henderson’s emphasis on govern-
ment, Kawashima could have speculated that the lack of lawyers’ services
resulted from a limited supply, not simply a low demand. By asserting that
in contrast to the West the Japanese do not demand the service of lawyers,
however, he implies an innate cultural or psychological preference for non-
lawyer-driven dispute resolution.19
Kawashima predicted that as Japan industrialized, entrenched social rela-
tionships inhibiting overt forms of conflict would weaken, “traditional” Japa-
nese values such as deference to authority would change, and litigation would
increase. In doing so, he is clearly reflecting the academic climate of his times.
Of the various intellectual currents that captivated scholars in the 1950s and
1960s, modernization and convergence were perhaps the most compelling.
Kawashima did not simply catch the wave; he was at the forefront of Japa-
nese modernization theorists who were consumed by the notion that Japan
was “behind” the West and ought to, had to, “catch up.” Closing the gap with
the West was not a simple matter of exchanging tatami for tile and kimono
for khaki. It involved the retooling of a broad array of social and political
practices, including law and legal behavior. Some could be transformed, or
at least changed, by design; others would change less consciously, a result of
fundamental shifts such as industrialization that had an ever-widening circle
of influence. In either case, modernization theorists saw a clear relationship
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between macro changes in social and economic structure and changes in indi-
vidual behavior. 
True to modernization theory, the contrast Kawashima draws between
Japan and the West is neither sharp nor absolute. In his view, litigation is the
exception, not the rule, in the resolution of conflicts everywhere. If litiga-
tion is more common in the United States than Japan, this phenomenon is
as likely to be a consequence of their different political economies, which
strongly influence (and, although Kawashima was not explicit about this, are
undoubtedly influenced by) cultural preferences and individual behavior. For
Kawashima and others, therefore, understanding the relationship between
social, economic, and political structure and law became a core area of inquiry;
exploring individual attitudes and beliefs about law, what came to be called
“ legal culture,” was an important part of their effort.20
A stepchild to literature on political culture that sought to correlate polit-
ical attitudes and beliefs with democratic practices and economic develop-
ment, analysts of legal culture were particularly interested in the connection
between law and modernization.21 To better understand legal culture, they
relied on opinion polls, questionnaires, and survey research that sought to
identify individual attitudes about law and conflict. Kawashima’s writings
on legal consciousness influenced many of those who studied Japanese legal
culture, who often forgot that sociocultural dispositions were only one aspect
of Kawashima’s explanation of the Japanese legal system.
Many studies of legal culture were methodologically unsophisticated, and
little consensus emerged about the meaning of legal culture generally or the
specifics of legal culture in any particular setting.22 Nonetheless, to special-
ists and casual observers, often armed with no more than anecdotal data, Japan
provided an interesting contrast to their vision of American legal culture. If
modern societies required modern legal systems (an assumption of those
studying legal culture in the United States),23 and one quality of a modern
legal system is its use by citizens to resolve disputes, then how should one
understand Japan? Litigation rates in Japan were far lower than those in the
United States; various aspects of Japan’s legal system seemed out of step with
the requirements of modernity.24 Yet Japan enjoyed the benefits of modern
law—most importantly, industrialization and a vibrant economy. The attrac-
tion of studying Japanese legal culture was that it offered a possible solution
to a puzzle; by exploring attitudes and beliefs about law in Japan, perhaps it
would be possible to better understand how, when, and why people turned
to the formal legal system, and which features of that system were critical to
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the growth of political and economic institutions. Such high expectations help
to explain why the study of Japanese legal culture captured the imagination
of so many scholars.
In a recent “hermeneutic, interpretive” essay in which he notes that “it is
no exaggeration to say that all Japanese studies have as their starting point a
discussion of Japanese culture,” Takao Tanase offers a thoughtful view of the
relationship between law, culture, and modernization.25 Taking as his start-
ing point Japan’s reception of foreign legal codes in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, Tanase accepts neither that such laws were anathema to Japanese
culture nor that they faced no cultural barriers. Instead, he claims that Japa-
nese society integrated and accommodated foreign legal codes in its own
particular manner. Arguing that “the low mobilization of the law among
the general public facilitated rather than hindered modernization in Japan,”
Tanase rejects Kawashima’s claims about the necessary connection between
law, culture, and modernization. In place of the assumption that Japan would
inevitably “progress” toward a modern, rational, Western legal system, Tanase
posits that Japan’s historical conditions make Japan unique in its experience
of modernity and its development of a legal system.26 Perhaps the different
conclusions reached by Kawashima and Tanase are simply a consequence of
the decades that divide them. Whatever the explanation, it is a testament to
the enduring influence of Kawashima’s work that Tanase, one of contem-
porary Japan’s most respected legal sociologists, continues to grapple with
an issue raised in Kawashima’s 1963 essay. 
Before further examining Kawashima’s influence, it may be useful to recap
the key features of his essay. Kawashima invoked Japanese culture, particu-
larly values such as deference to authority and harmony, to explain the infre-
quency with which disputes end up in Japanese courts. His turn to culture
takes places within the context of a complex (and sometimes contradictory)
argument that the state can exercise its authority by controlling formal
conflict, and that disputes in every society are likely to be resolved infor-
mally. In Japan (as elsewhere), he indicates that there are many reasons why
people keep their distance from courts, including the monetary costs of lit-
igation and the limited compensation awarded by Japanese judges. Look-
ing to the future, he predicts that Japan will change as a consequence of
industrialization and urbanization, making courts, lawyers, and litigation a
more central part of the system of dispute resolution. But that change will
be subtle; litigation will not spiral out of control, and alternative means of
resolving disputes will survive, as they do everywhere, and will continue to
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offer disputants a faster, less expensive, and more responsive way to handle
conflict.
I I I .  KAWASHIMA’S INFLUENCE 
ON THE POSTWAR STUDY OF JAPANESE LAW
Kawashima’s work has powerfully influenced the entire corpus of scholar-
ship on dispute resolution in Japan. Strong convictions have been developed
about its merits and flaws by scholars and students (even those who have not
read much or any of Kawashima’s writing) who cut their critical teeth by
attacking or extolling Kawashima’s central claims and proposing alternative
(and allegedly more sound) theories of Japanese conflict. A multitude of fol-
low-up studies pursue both his core themes and more tangential issues. He
is widely considered one of the most influential minds (often the single most
influential mind) of Japan’s postwar legal academy.27 Why Kawashima has
struck such an extraordinarily resonant chord is a question about which one
can speculate. That he did so is beyond dispute.28
Four types of research and writing about Japanese law and disputing are
particularly identifiable as Kawashima’s progeny. First are culturalist approaches,
which assert or assume that the study of Japanese dispute resolution is pri-
marily a subset of the study of Japanese culture. Second are analyses that focus
on social and political structure as the explanatory engine of Japanese
conflict. Third is research in law and economics that applies a set of assump-
tions about rational behavior to the study of Japanese disputing. Fourth are
case studies of law and society in Japan that make use of and extend the
insights of cultural, institutional, and law and economics perspectives by exam-
ining concrete legal dispute. In what follows, I will highlight what I consider
to be the writings that best exemplify each of these approaches to the analy-
sis of Japanese dispute resolution. Together, they constitute a large body of
work that emerges from Kawashima’s analysis in “Dispute Resolution in Con-
temporary Japan” but pushes it in new and important directions. 
a.  culturalist approaches
Kawashima’s most fundamental contribution has been to stimulate research
and writing on the link between Japanese law and Japanese culture. Indeed,
many have read Kawashima narrowly, as if his only insight was that Japanese
law is an outgrowth of Japanese culture. One example is the 1979 article by
Chin Kim and Craig M. Lawson, “The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Tradi-
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tional Japanese Conception of Law.”29 Kim and Lawson argue that, at root,
the Japanese simply do not “ like” law. As they put it:
The resolution of disputes [in Japan] . . . requires the restoration of harmony
and mutual understanding. Lawsuits, on the other hand, pit one party against
the other and determine which one shall win, thereby further straining the
relationship and further injuring the delicate spirit of wa. The spirit of har-
mony and the social tie (en) that binds all relationships act together on the
Japanese mind, which therefore tends not to view a dispute in terms of per-
sonal rights and duties. The harmonious settlement of disputes through mutual
understanding is virtuous; the fight to finish in the courtroom is shameful.30
A more recent example can be found in Yasunobu Sato’s Commercial Dis-
pute Processing and Japan, where he writes: “Japan, together with China and other
East Asian countries influenced by Confucian philosophy, has a conciliation
culture where mediation or conciliation has long been a preferred mechanism
for dispute processing. This culture is in sharp contrast to the Western adver-
sarial culture based on individuals, which views conflict and dispute positively.”31
In these and many other writings that acknowledge a debt to Kawashima,
much of the nuance and complexity that characterize “Dispute Resolution
in Contemporary Japan” is lost, replaced by the uninspiring claim that the
influence of Japanese culture on Japanese law is unmitigated. To the ques-
tion of why the Japanese do not sue, Kawashima’s supposed answer is cul-
ture. To the question of why Japan has so few lawyers comes his answer,
culture. To the question of why informal mechanisms of dispute resolution
are well utilized in Japan, again, culture. Never mind that Kawashima makes
clear in his writing that culture is only one of many factors that shape legal
behavior; forget his insistence that litigation is disfavored everywhere, regard-
less of culture. The conventional wisdom is simply that Kawashima was a
champion of culturalist views of Japanese law.32 For the past four decades,
scholars in Japan and the United States who are interested in shedding light
on law in Japan have taken that view as their starting point. From their efforts
has emerged a set of articles about legal behavior in Japan that generally exag-
gerate and oversimplify what they assert to be Kawashima’s basic premise.
Summarizing fifty years of comparative scholarship on dispute resolution
in the United States and Japan in 1975, for example, Roger Benjamin writes:
[T]he Japanese are held to be group-oriented, structure their individual and
collective relationships in vertical combinations for social control purposes,
Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan 59
 1.Foote, Law in Japan  3/19/07  09:47 AM  Page 59
and emphasize consensus in conflict resolution. By contrast, Americans are
thought to be individualistic, stress equality in individual and collective rela-
tionships to structure social control, and prefer an adversarial, bargaining style
of conflict resolution. Fundamentally, these differences are attributed to value
systems in the two societies which emphasize individualistic versus group-
oriented decision-making styles. And it is axiomatic that, at the base of these
decision-making styles, are very different value systems of conflict resolution
and social control.33
Others have pursued more specific aspects of the nexus between law and
culture. Richard Parker, for example, accepts the view that Japanese values
of trust, interdependence, and group harmony create a general antipathy to
law.34 In his view, one important but overlooked reason for the relatively mar-
ginal place of law in Japanese society is that, unlike in the West, Japanese soci-
ety is not structured around language. Because law, according to Parker,
controls behavior through the use of a written language, and written language
occupies a less central place in Japan than in the West, law is less vital in Japan.
J. C. Smith also reads Kawashima as positing that the Japanese have a unique
distaste for law.35 Instead of tracing the source of that distaste to language,
he posits that the key difference between the role of law in Japan and the West
can best be understood by exploring psychology and ethics, particularly con-
ceptions of self, that lead people in Japan to privilege emotions over reason.
Similar claims have been turned into political arguments. Former government
official Naohiro Amaya believes that cultural differences between Japan and
the United States cause U.S. antimonopoly laws to clash with Japanese val-
ues and argues that those laws therefore should not be adopted. Minister Tora-
nosuke Katayama of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts
and Telecommunications, criticizing a lawsuit brought against his ministry
by five telecom companies, states: “Resorting to legal action (over this kind
of case) has been popular in the United States . . . But such means are not
harmonious with Japan’s (legal) culture.”36
There have been some more serious attempts to examine the relationship
between law and culture. Setsuo Miyazawa, in a review essay that discusses
the legacy of Kawashima, describes a number of empirical studies of legal
culture and legal consciousness.37 One of them, by Kawashima’s successor
at the University of Tokyo, Kahei Rokumoto, relied on a particularly sophis-
ticated group of empirical and theoretical studies.38 Despite the research of
Rokumoto and a few others, however, Miyazawa concludes that “since
Kawashima’s works appeared, the dominant form of analysis of Japanese legal
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consciousness has been anecdotal.” Miyazawa describes as “ambiguous” and
“contradictory” several national surveys of law and culture conducted in the
1970s and 1980s by the Nippon Bunka Kaigi, Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai, and others,
and he argues that surveys on Japanese legal culture contain weak questions
and obtain unreliable answers. 
There are, of course, studies of dispute resolution that acknowledge a debt
to Kawashima’s claims about Japanese legal culture but are not overly con-
strained by them. In an article that examines the role of courts and judges in
dispute resolution in Japan, for example, Tetsuya Obuchi challenges Kawa-
shima’s claim that the Japanese regard law like an heirloom samurai sword,
something to be treasured but not used.39 Instead, he argues that while people
may first seek negotiated settlements to their disputes, they will also resort
to litigation. Legal culture, in his view, can accommodate a variety of differ-
ent approaches to conflict. And, notwithstanding his criticism of the litera-
ture on Japanese legal culture, Miyazawa himself did not abandon culture as
a variable in understanding differences between legal behavior in the United
States and Japan, as his work on international conflict resolution makes clear.40
Nonetheless, the study of Japanese legal culture has not gone much beyond
the insights contained in Kawashima’s 1963 article. Indeed, many studies have
ignored the context in which Kawashima embedded his cultural analysis and
have instead argued for a vision of law and dispute resolution in Japan that
is entirely shaped by culture. The narrow scope of such views has invited
ridicule, and many scholars have turned away from culture and sought other
explanations for Japanese legal behavior. One of them, presented as a direct
challenge to culture, is a structural analysis that focuses on the configuration
of legal institutions. 
b.  institutional approaches
Cultural explanations of Japanese disputing behavior owe much to Kawa-
shima’s analysis of why individuals allegedly prefer to resolve conflicts out-
side of formal legal channels. Individual preferences, however, are neither
simple to identify nor easy to generalize, and whether culture or something
else is the source of individual law-related behavior is difficult to establish.
Not only are individuals members of and participants in cultural practices
and rituals; they are also influenced by a variety of political and economic
forces that give shape to social practices.
In his landmark article on Japanese law, “The Myth of the Reluctant Lit-
igant,” John Owen Haley countered what he saw as Kawashima’s overem-
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phasis on culture in explaining Japanese dispute resolution.41 Haley expresses
skepticism about claims that the Japanese have a “deeply rooted cultural pref-
erence” for informal, mediated settlements; an aversion to formal adjudica-
tion; a penchant for compromise; a distrust of all-or-none solutions; and a
dislike of public quarrels.42 To evaluate what he sees as Kawashima’s over-
reliance on cultural causes of legal behavior, Haley seeks to answer a deci-
sive question: Are the Japanese so strongly oriented by their culture to
informally resolve disputes that they are willing to settle for less than they
would be awarded if they litigated?43 If the answer is yes, then Haley will
concede that the Japanese are averse to litigation. No concession is necessary;
he answers his query in the negative. 
At the heart of Haley’s argument is an examination of litigation rates
between 1890 and 1974.44 Noting that litigation was more frequent before 1937
than in more recent decades, Haley labels as “myth” the view that the Japa-
nese are reluctant to resolve their grievances in court. The reality, he sug-
gests, is that litigation was offensive to “those who wished to maintain a
paternalistic order based on a hierarchical submission to authority.”45 Because
governing elites viewed litigation as destructive of a social order based on
personal relationships (which, not coincidentally, is exactly the type of social
order that enabled the elites to govern), they sought to limit litigation by cre-
ating other avenues for the resolution of disputes. 
Japanese elites, in Haley’s view, used a number of mechanisms to suppress
litigation. They controlled the number of judges and attorneys by using an
examination system that artificially limited entry to the legal profession.46
Caseloads were made high and the legal process was crafted to operate slowly,
results of a conscious decision to dissuade people from utilizing the formal
legal process. Courts were denied contempt powers and possessed few reme-
dies, which made it difficult to enforce judicial decisions. These and other
features of the Japanese legal system made going to court expensive, time-
consuming, frustrating, and unrewarding and resulted in many people fore-
going their day in court. Like Kawashima, therefore, Haley did more than
simply assert the importance of his claims. He turned to the data and argued
that the Japanese government carefully controlled the process of dispute res-
olution. By forcing people to use informal mechanisms to resolve disputes
and promoting the belief that they do so because they are harmonious and
shun overt conflict, the government succeeded in minimizing challenges to
its legitimacy and authority. 
The brilliance of Haley’s argument was his presentation of a seemingly
clear and plausible causal alternative to the idea that traditional values were
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the primary shaper of legal behavior. Institutions also have a powerful
influence on behavior, he argued; then he demonstrated how institutions
themselves were manipulated to keep people from the courts. His dichotomy
between culture and institutions was crucial to his project. Without spelling
out whether he meant to bring attention to institutions as organizational units
or social practices, and never offering a solution to the chicken-and-egg prob-
lem of how to disentangle institutions from their cultural context, Haley made
it easy for readers to feel that there was now an alternative paradigm to cul-
ture as a window on Japanese law. 
Haley’s emphasis on institutional configuration in the analysis of Japanese
conflict has been pursued by a number of other specialists of Japanese law
and society. Although he is a keen observer of culture, David Johnson’s study
of Japanese criminal justice, for example, concentrates on factors such as the
training and promotion of prosecutors to explain conviction rates and sen-
tencing.47 And Toshiko Takenaka, in her evaluation of Japan’s legal regime
controlling intellectual property, rejects a cultural approach and instead
argues that intellectual property law in Japan is the result of conscious polit-
ical choices aimed at crafting a particular set of legal doctrines and practices.48
Although the arguments presented by Kawashima and Haley may appear
to be powerfully contradictory, they can be read as simply differing in empha-
sis rather than as mutually exclusive formulations. Kawashima is attentive to
issues of political and social structure, but they are not his primary interest.
His discussion of how the government instituted chOtei (mediation) practices
suggests an appreciation of the influence of institutional configuration on
the behavior of disputants, and his claim that citizens “preferred” mediation
to litigation leaves room for an explanation that such preferences are created
by institutional design. Similarly, Haley does not explicitly addresses the ques-
tion of why (or whether) the particular institutions he highlights are more
prominent in Japan than elsewhere. The context and origin of Haley’s insti-
tutions go largely unexplored, but the individuals who constitute institutions
and the time and place in which those institutions arose are connected to a
particular society, which suggests a crucial role for culture.49 Unfortunately,
the subtlety of Kawashima’s and Haley’s disagreement has been regularly
ignored, with the result that much scholarship about law and dispute reso-
lution in Japan asks whether it is best understood through the lens of culture
or institutions, as if these were concepts that did not almost always intersect.50
The oft-noted tension between Kawashima’s emphasis on cultural expla-
nations of Japanese disputing behavior and the primacy Haley gives to insti-
tutions, therefore, is far less acute than one might initially suppose. As
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already stated, Kawashima is well aware of the power of mutable (and manip-
ulable) institutions, even though he chooses to focus much of his writing on
culture. Likewise, there is ample room in Haley’s thesis to insert culture; at
the very least, it is the context in which the elite create and mutate various
institutions, and must therefore exert some influence on both the shapers
of institutions and institutions themselves. More fundamental, the issue at
stake in the differing interpretations set forth by Kawashima and Haley—
whether cultural or institutional factors have a greater influence on legal
behavior and therefore on the resolution of disputes—may ultimately resist
a compelling conclusion. Disentangling culture from institutions has shown
itself to be an extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, task. Culture is
dynamic, shaped and transformed over time by changes in technology, new
forms of social organization, and a variety of other factors.51 Institutions are
similarly malleable. Since culture is both a product of and the genesis of insti-
tutions, and institutions both create and are created by culture, convincingly
demonstrating which one of them is responsible for certain aspects of the
legal system is likely to elude even the most able minds.
c.  law and economics approaches
It should come as no surprise that a third approach to disputing behavior in
Japan, most closely identified with Harvard Law School’s J. Mark Ramseyer,
exhibits both great originality and a deep debt to previous scholarship.
Rooted in a view of individual behavior that emphasizes rational decision
making, this perspective examines the choices of those engaged in conflict,
particularly their decisions about whether and when to settle or sue. Although
a rational choice approach to the analysis of disputes does not explicitly reject
the potential relevance of cultural or institutional perspectives (indeed, it incor-
porates elements of both), it takes a somewhat different path in seeking to
understand the contours of disputing behavior. At its core is the claim that
the measure of a successful legal system is predictability. A predictable sys-
tem makes it easier for potential litigants to settle their disputes “in the shadow
of the law,” thereby achieving results that are similar to those that would result
from litigation but without the high transaction costs. 
Whereas culturalists posit that disputing behavior is primarily a consequence
of psychosocial values and influences, and structuralists emphasize the shap-
ing power of institutions, those working within the assumptions of law and
economics highlight the intellectual, rational bases of decisions about the res-
olution of conflict that enable litigants to maximize their wealth in light of
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expected litigated outcomes. These different emphases should not obscure
important similarities. Litigants may make rational, wealth-maximizing deci-
sions about whether to settle or sue, but they make those decisions within a
cultural and institutional context that determines the legal rules, the avail-
ability of dispute resolution procedures, the norms that govern relationships
between people and groups, and the definition of rationality. As Ramseyer
puts it, “Through culture, people make sense of what they experience;
through culture, they decide what it is that they most value. As a result, one
cannot properly understand the empirical world without a sense of culture.”52
Ramseyer’s emphasis on rational decision making and wealth maximization
clearly differs from Kawashima’s focus. But Kawashima certainly would have
embraced (and did to some extent anticipate) one aspect of the law and eco-
nomics analysis, arguing that “parties in dispute usually find that resort to a
lawsuit is less profitable than resort to other means of settlement.”53 Haley’s
focus on the costs imposed by institutional barriers to litigation also com-
plements Ramseyer’s analysis. As Ramseyer approvingly notes, “Haley’s first
and central proposition [in “The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant” is that] Japa-
nese do not sue because suing does not pay.”54
The connection between approaches to law and dispute resolution that
focus on institutions per Haley and individual rationality per Ramseyer is most
apparent with regard to predictability. The predictability of judicial decisions
depends on a number of factors. A legal system without rules of stare deci-
sis and dependent on juries, for example, would in most cases be less pre-
dictable than one that emphasized the importance of following precedent
and gave judges a monopoly on decision making. In Japan, Ramseyer empha-
sizes, there are no juries; judges can (and do) communicate their leanings to
litigants; trials unfold slowly over many months or years; and a highly ordered
judicial structure emphasizes the standardization of judgments.55 Haley
might regard these features of the Japanese legal system as institutional imped-
iments that are manipulated to dissuade people from litigating; Ramseyer
emphasizes their economic, communicative function, which enables litigants
rationally to decide whether to pursue their disputes in court or to seek a
resolution through other means. Ramseyer and Haley may agree about the
rationality of disputants, who evaluate the cost of litigation when deciding
whether to sue. But where Haley sees institutional barriers that make using
the courts prohibitively expensive, Ramseyer sees a legal system that is so trans-
parent that litigants can resolve their differences with reference to their
expected litigated outcomes. 
Like approaches to disputing grounded in culture and institutions, a
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rational choice perspective offers an explanation of Japanese dispute-resolv-
ing behavior that cannot stand alone. If rationality means that individuals
will refuse to settle for an amount less than a court is likely to award—that
is, that people in Japan will “avoid” a judicial determination only if they think
that the determination is no more lucrative than an out-of-court settlement—
then data become essential. What do people and/or their legal representa-
tives know, and think they know, about how courts will resolve particular
disputes? Are they similarly well (or poorly) informed about extrajudicial
processes? Can potential litigants and their counsel obtain sufficient infor-
mation about how a particular conflict is likely to be handled by different
dispute resolvers when they are actually facing a dispute? As Ramseyer
acknowledges, his thesis and the issues it raises “don’t lend themselves to
testable hypotheses.”56
Consequently, one can use the basic framework he proposes while reshap-
ing the theory in various ways. Rather than associate rational behavior with
actions that are exclusively influenced by financial incentives, for example,
the definition of rationality can be broadened. Research on courts and liti-
gation reveals a mix of incentives for why people go to court; winning is one
of them, but so too is the opportunity to have one’s day in court, to be heard
by a neutral third party, to exercise one’s rights.57 There may be equally strong
reasons why people choose not to litigate; it takes time, can exact a reputa-
tional cost, and can conclusively sever a relationship, among others.58 In addi-
tion, people may have a particular self-image—as strong-willed and assertive,
or perhaps harmonious and consensual—and make decisions about which
method of dispute resolution to utilize that are not primarily motivated by
an assessment of their likelihood of victory. This does not mean that such
litigants are irrational, but that different people in similar circumstances may
take into consideration different conditions in their rational calculations.
Understanding those differences may lead one back to a consideration of cul-
tural and institutional variation.59
The economic perspective on dispute resolution in Japan includes a nor-
mative claim that conflicts with Haley’s emphasis on institutional design. In
Ramseyer’s view, Japan’s system of dispute resolution (indeed, any system of
dispute resolution) is laudable if it is highly predictable and thereby encour-
ages disputants to settle their claims informally. As he puts it, “Litigation is
scarce in Japan not because the system is bankrupt. It is scarce because the
system works.”60 That conclusion clashes with a normative implication of
Haley’s work—that Japan’s scarcity of litigation is an indication that people
are being inappropriately kept from the courts and are unable to seek justice.
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Ramseyer may be correct in arguing that it is desirable for a legal system to
minimize transaction costs and maximize individual advantage by finding ways
for disputants to resolve conflicts without the time and expense associated
with litigation. But his position takes as a given the content of legal rules,
and it therefore has little to say about the degree to which the resolution of
conflict “in the shadow of the law” achieves a normatively desirable result in
a given case. Similarly, his approach does not address the role that litigation
may play in changing legal rules. Judicial decisions often reshape or at least
adjust particular rules as a consequence of new cases that challenge existing
legal interpretations and practices. In simple and highly standardized areas
of law the rules may be relatively impermeable. But in many situations new
cases bring novel issues, and if they are not litigated then legal rules will fos-
silize and the “shadow” of the law will cease to shift. 
d. case studies
Studies that focus on the evolution and resolution of particular legal conflicts
also owe a debt to Kawashima. In “Dispute Resolution in Contemporary
Japan” and many of his later writings, Kawashima made elegant use of par-
ticular legal conflicts to illustrate his theoretical concerns. In fact, many of
Kawashima’s generalizations about Japanese law and culture appear to have
emerged from his study of specific types of conflicts, particularly disputes
between contracting parties.61 Some have followed a similar path and sought
to examine concrete legal conflicts in order to develop and test theories of
Japanese dispute resolution. Such studies tend to be conceptually rooted in
one of the approaches discussed above—cultural, institutional, and law and
economics. But they differ from the writings highlighted under those head-
ings because they ground their analyses in detailed case studies of discrete
conflicts and are therefore more inductive than many (but not all) of the pre-
viously discussed works.
The resolution of disputes over traffic accidents, for example, has attracted
the attention of a number of scholars. It was Kawashima who first used traffic
accidents to generalize about dispute resolution. He noticed that although
there were numerous railroad and taxi accidents in 1960, very few were
brought to court.62 His explanation for this, like his explanation for low levels
of litigation more generally, highlighted what he called “the social-cultural
background.”63 By using traffic accident data as a window on Japanese dis-
pute resolution, Kawashima triggered an ongoing debate.
In both an article and a book chapter, Ramseyer argues that the behavior
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of heirs of victims of fatal traffic accidents calls into question claims that the
Japanese do not assert their legal rights because of cultural barriers and also
contradicts the assumptions of institutional approaches. Instead, he argues,
heirs settle their claims for amounts that are close to what a court would award,
which strongly suggests that legal rules structure out-of-court settlements.64
Tanase offers a somewhat different analysis, proposing a “management model”
for Japanese non-litigiousness.65 Using data about compensation for auto-
mobile accidents (a broader category than the fatal accidents that Ramseyer
examines), he claims that the Japanese government creates a non-litigious soci-
ety by successfully managing both the supply of judicial resources and the
demand for litigation. It does so by providing free consultation to accident
victims, creating a standard system of compensation, and offering extraju-
dicial methods of dispute resolution. Tanase’s model borrows aspects of the
cultural, institutional, and economic approaches, but combines them in a novel
way. Other studies of traffic accident disputes, like those of Shozo Ota and
Daniel Foote, add further nuance to the interpretation of how best to under-
stand the disposition of such conflicts.66 These studies provide valuable insight
into how a certain type of conflict—one that is routine, addresses harms that
range from minor to fatal, and brings together random parties—is handled.
But there are many other forms of conflict that do not fit such a pattern; since
the mid-1980s, a number of studies have focused on disputes that bring to
the table a variety of other issues. 
A case-based approach—and one that also investigates quotidian conflicts—
animates Mark West’s work on karaoke, lost objects, love hotels, and other
issues. In “The Resolution of Karaoke Disputes: The Calculus of Institutions
and Social Capital,” for example, West frames his work with references to
Kawashima, Haley, and Ramseyer.67 Like them, he is interested in explaining
the cause of Japanese non-litigiousness; to do so, he highlights the interplay
of individual decision making, economics, and culture. Picking up on Frank
Upham’s work on environmental pollution (discussed below) but narrowing
the focus to private disputes over noisy karaoke bars, West argues that the
decision to pursue complaints over karaoke noise through litigation, extrale-
gal dispute resolution mechanisms, or settlement reflects a mix of pressures—
financial, institutional, and cultural. Which factor is most relevant will
depend largely on the type and context of the dispute and on the available
dispute resolution options. Rather than offer support for a single approach
to dispute resolution, West suggests that the best explanation is likely to be
eclectic. 
In Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan, the most well-known example
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of a case-based approach to Japanese dispute resolution, Frank Upham tack-
les issues far more complex than traffic accidents.68 Upham roots his book in
the study of four legal conflicts that involve the state: environmental pollu-
tion, minority rights, gender discrimination, and industrial policy. Each sec-
tion of the book unravels a complex dispute, which enables the reader to gain
an understanding of the personalities, politics, and particularities of the specific
issue being presented. But the conflicts are not simply described; they are
couched in the context of a more general argument about the operation of
Japanese law. 
Upham’s chapter on environmental pollution illustrates his argument. It
tells the tragic story of mercury poisoning caused by industrial effluents
released by the Chisso company and the response of those who suffered as
a consequence of the pollution. We learn that some of those affected by the
mercury were reluctant to sue, in part because they worried about being
known as people who would use the legal system to vindicate their rights.69
Ultimately, the victims were split into three groups; those who asked the gov-
ernment’s Ministry of Health and Welfare to mediate their dispute with
Chisso, those who directly negotiated with Chisso, and those who sued. It is
here that Upham turns his lens to the interests of the government and makes
his most original contribution. He argues that the state’s primary concern is
with the process through which the conflict between Chisso and the victims
of mercury contamination is resolved, not the content of the resolution. The
government worried that the victims and their growing political movement
would seize control of the dispute resolution process, and it therefore moved
to placate those who sought justice. It did so in three ways: by working to
solve the underlying problem of industrial pollution, discrediting the antipol-
lution movement by creating an extrajudicial process through which disputes
over pollution could be resolved, and “settling the moral accounts” resulting
from government and business involvement in industrial pollution by com-
pensating victims.70 Upham’s argument does not champion a particular ver-
sion of Japanese culture, but it does locate the victims of Chisso’s pollution
in a social context, in which their actions are embedded in values that reflect
Japanese village life. Likewise, he emphasizes the institutions that facilitate
and/or inhibit the resolution of conflict.
The core cases discussed in Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan revolve
around conflicts between groups of the aggrieved and the state. Moreover,
the victims in all three cases are relatively powerless and traditionally disad-
vantaged; that may explain, at least in part, their willingness to litigate. It is
therefore difficult to generalize from these cases to more individually focused
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resolution of conflict, as well as to disputes that arise between those of rel-
atively equal social status. Nonetheless, Upham has extended Kawashima’s
emphasis on specific, individual conflicts to a consideration of disputes that
are political, moral, and socially disruptive. More than disputes over barking
dogs and bad brakes, such conflicts may reveal the fundamental values and
workings of a society.
Others have also examined broad-based social conflict as a means of bet-
ter understanding dispute resolution in Japan. In The Ritual of Rights in Japan:
Law, Society, and Health Policy, for example, I highlight two disputes that
involve both legislation and litigation—brain death / organ transplantation,
and HIV/AIDS—to draw attention to how the explicit assertion of legal rights
has become a common feature of Japanese dispute resolution.71 Rather than
seek to explain why there is so little litigation in Japan, my concern is to better
understand the many dimensions of Japanese conflict—cultural, economic,
and political—and how it is resolved. The disputes I investigate are not the
everyday conflicts between neighbors; they involve broad issues of policy, large
groups of people, and highly politicized struggles.
Contentious public disputes over policy are not the only, or necessarily the
last, vantage point from which to understand the role of law in the resolu-
tion of disputes, as I discuss in my study of the tuna auction at Tokyo’s Tsukiyi
wholesale market.72 At Tsukiyi, dealers make use of an ingenious govern-
ment-operated tuna court to manage conflicts over the quality of auctional
fish. In contrast to studies in the United States that highlight the efficiency
of informal norms for resolving disputes among close-knit actors, and the
corrosive impact of formal legal conflict on continuing relationships, I argue
that Japan’s tuna merchants are heavily dependent on formal legal rules to
resolve their conflicts. In the Tokyo tuna auction, the invocation of law and
the embrace of formal methods to resolve conflict bind tuna traders,
strengthen their relationships, and are extremely fast and effective. Setsuo
Miyazawa, Robert Kidder, David Apter, Susan Pharr, John Campbell, Chalmers
Johnson, Mark Levin, Robert Leflar, and other scholars of law and politics
have also moved beyond Kawashima’s focus on individual conflict resolution
and examined aggregated claims and politicized disputes.73 Many of their stud-
ies examine issues that emerged in late twentieth-century Japan, such as gen-
der equality, industrial pollution, and patients’ rights, among others. Because
such conflicts are less likely to be shaped by interpersonal pressures or com-
munity norms than those highlighted by Kawashima, they may more fre-
quently end up in court.74 Indeed, certain factors that Kawashima identified
as affecting the future of dispute resolution—urbanization, industrialization,
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greater equality of citizens, more universalistic standards, and greater asser-
tion of legal rights—appear to have had an impact on the types of disputes
that arise and the process through which they are resolved. Were he alive today,
Kawashima might counsel legal scholars to develop a taxonomy of conflict,
from the mundane to the far-reaching, from those involving exclusively pri-
vate disputes to group-oriented policy controversies, and seek to disentan-
gle the relative influences of culture, costs, institutions, and political power
that have an impact on how they are managed, both in Japan and compara-
tively. Without such guidance, scholars may continue to examine discrete areas
of conflict without the benefit of a general framework that distinguishes dif-
ferent types of conflicts and links them to a particular approach to dispute
resolution. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE 
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN
Looking back at the forty years of scholarship on Japanese law and conflict
inspired by Kawashima’s “Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan,” it is
extraordinary that one paper (followed, of course, by his many other publi-
cations) has played such a central role in delineating the questions that con-
tinue to animate the study of Japanese law and society. Even today, almost
every important contribution to the literature on disputing in Japan, and most
general writings on the Japanese legal system, pay homage to Kawashima.
Whether intended as a direct rebuttal of Kawashima’s thesis, a modification
of his claims, or a reaffirmation of his argument, Kawashima’s work is the
reference point from which all others—young and not so young, Japanese
and non-Japanese, lawyers, sociologists, and political scientists—begin. 
Kawashima’s predictions about the future of law and dispute resolution
in Japan are also regularly revisited. For every article that claims Kawashima’s
expectations have proved true, one can find contrary assertions that history
has exposed his errors.75 It is therefore particularly interesting that the move-
ment to reform the Japanese legal system that began in the mid-1990s may
be poised to bring about, by conscious institutional manipulation, a variety
of the changes that Kawashima thought would inevitably arise from mod-
ernization.76 Organizations and institutions such as Keidanren, the Japan Fed-
eration of Bar Associations, the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the
Liberal Democratic Party, and others have at least superficially embraced the
“rule of law” as an essential component of Japan’s future success.77 For a vari-
ety of often conflicting reasons, these groups have agreed (with varying
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degrees of enthusiasm) to expand the population of legal professionals in
Japan, speed up the workings of the civil courts, introduce lay opinion into
determinations of criminal wrongdoing, decrease the financial costs imposed
on those who want to sue, make legal expertise more readily available to those
who previously could not afford it, change the system of legal education, and
allow law firms more flexibility to operate in a competitive domestic and inter-
national environment, among other things. 
The overall impact of these changes is unclear, at least for now, but it is
possible that they will push the system in the direction that Kawashima pre-
dicted—a greater reliance on universalistic rules, more individual rights asser-
tion, more litigation, and less reliance on social norms as the glue that orders
social relations. Ironically—but perhaps not surprisingly, given that many
reformers graduated from the University of Tokyo’s Faculty of Law when
Kawashima’s influence was at its peak—the reformers retain a strong alle-
giance to a culturalist view of Japanese law, despite their conscious manipu-
lation of institutions to facilitate change. The June 2001 report of the Justice
System Reform Council, for example, the government’s key legal reform body,
states: 
[T]he Council has determined that the fundamental task for reform of the
justice system is to define clearly “what we must do to transform both the
spirit of the law and the rule of law into the flesh and blood of this country,
so that they become “the shape of our country”. . . In other words, how should
those mechanisms [of the justice system] and the legal profession be reformed
so as to make the law (order), which serves as the core of freedom and fair-
ness on which “our country” should be based, broadly penetrate the entire
state and all of society and become alive in the people’s daily life?78
It is impossible to know whether or to what extent such efforts to revamp
Japan’s legal culture will succeed, or how the changes that are now occurring
will ultimately affect the process of dispute resolution or the substantive out-
come of particular conflicts. Significant political differences have surfaced
among those involved in the conceptualization and implementation of judi-
cial reform, and some parties would like to create an expanded role for alter-
native methods of dispute resolution that could limit the number of cases that
end up in the courts. Regardless of whose interests prevail in the current legal
reform debate, it is clear that the framework Kawashima provided for exam-
ining the interweaving of law and culture in Japan will continue to shape the
analysis and discussion of dispute resolution for decades to come. 
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